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Monetary policy rules 




The last decade has witnessed widespread changes in the monetary and exchange rate regimes of 
many emerging economies. The central banks of these economies have become more independent, 
inflation targeting regimes have gained momentum and exchange rate regimes are more flexible. 
However, there is limited empirical work assessing the economic consequences of these regime 
changes, particularly in comparison with the extensive literature that focuses on the same topics for 
the industrial countries. 
In an attempt to partially fill this gap, this paper uses small structural VAR models to explore three 
connected issues that are relevant to the pursuance of a stability-oriented monetary policy in the 
emerging markets. 
First, is it possible to have model-based measures of core inflation capable of reflecting price level 
movements that are due to the activity of monetary authorities and for which these authorities are 
accountable? The first section of the paper explores this topic using a small SVAR not yet considered 
for this purpose by the existing literature. 
Second, is it possible to estimate the reaction function of the central banks of mature emerging 
economies and compare the results with those obtained for industrial economies? Section 2 of the 
paper provides these estimates and illustrates the main difficulties in applying to emerging economies 
analytical tools that have been successfully used for the main industrial economies. 
In the third section of the paper simulations of the effects of alternative monetary policy rules or the 
main macroeconomic variables of a selected number of economies are presented. These simulations 
are compared with those obtained for the euro area under similar assumptions. 
The last section provides a summary of the results and some conclusions. 
1.  The quest for a robust monetary regime for mature emerging 
economies 
In the past few years momentous changes have occurred in the monetary and exchange rate regimes 
of most emerging countries. In Latin America, after decades of extreme swings in inflation and in the 
exchange rate (due to overly accommodating monetary policy and unsustainable fiscal laxity), massive 
outflows of capital (despite widespread capital controls) and repeated systemic disruptions in the 
domestic financial systems, successful reforms radically changed the landscape in the second half of 
the 1990s. Inflation is now under the control of more independent central banks, fiscal deficits have 
been reduced to manageable proportions, capital mobility is generally very high, and exchange rates 
far more flexible but nonetheless far more stable than previously. In Asia, countries are recovering 
from devastating currency and banking crises that have interrupted years of price and exchange rate 
stability. As in Latin America, exchange rate regimes in the majority of Asian countries no longer 
exhibit the characteristics of the hard pegs of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
                                                        
1   I am very grateful to Stephan Gerlach for valuable comments and also to Stephan Arthur, Anna Cobau and Marc Klau for 
their effective statistical assistance.  
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Following their exit from monetary arrangements based on exchange rate ￿fixity￿, the majority of these 
emerging economies have been confronted with the need to adopt a new monetary framework and 
are still facing issues similar to those encountered in the recent past by the industrial countries, 
namely: the inflationary outcomes of discretionary monetary policies, the difficulties of implementing 
direct monetary control strategies due to the instability of the intermediate targets stemming from the 
liberalisation of their financial systems, and the unsustainability of the hard pegs in a world of much 
increased capital mobility and not fully credible policies. 
Economic events, however, do not fully explain the trend towards monetary policy frameworks centred 
on the basic tenet that the primary, if not exclusive, task of central banks is to achieve and maintain 
price stability. Important theoretical advances have also played a role in catalysing this global regime 
shift. 
1.1  Monetary policy rules for closed economies 
The theoretical work has concentrated on identifying a commitment mechanism capable of ensuring 
macroeconomic stability while leaving monetary authorities with some room for exercising discretion. 
Three main theoretical considerations explain these developments. 
￿First, after a long period of near exclusive focus on the role of nonmonetary factors in the business 
cycle, a stream of empirical work beginning in the late 1980s has made the case that monetary policy 
significantly influences the short-term course of the real economy.￿ 
￿Second, there has been considerable improvement in the underlying theoretical frameworks used for 
policy analysis.￿ 
2 
And, third, ￿there may be gains from enhancing credibility either by formal commitment to a policy rule 
or by introducing some kind of institutional arrangement that achieves roughly the same end￿ 
3. 
Inflation targeting has emerged as a monetary framework that subsumes a complex institutional 
arrangement. In fact, as Mishkin and Savastano (2000, p 32) put it, inflation targeting involves several 
elements:  ￿(1)  the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation; (2)  an 
institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals 
are subordinated; (3) an information-inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just monetary 
aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; (4)  a 
transparent monetary policy strategy that ascribes a central role to communicating to the public and 
the markets the plans, objectives, and rationale for the decisions of the central bank; and 
(5) mechanisms that make the central bank accountable for attaining its inflation objectives. The list 
should clarify one crucial point about inflation targeting: it entails much more than a public 
announcement of numerical targets for inflation for the year ahead.￿ These elements describe a 
general ￿framework for policy within which ￿constrained discretion￿ can be exercised￿
4 in a world where 
rigid rules have ceased to have any effectiveness.  
Several monetary ￿rules￿ have been proposed by the literature that are consistent with this approach. 
Following Taylor,
5 a very parsimonious representation of the framework for closed economies is 
provided by the following two expressions: 
t t t t u r g L B Y g L A Y    ) , ( ) , (  (1) 
t t r t x t t g r g x g g r          0 1 .   (2) 
                                                        
2   Clarida et al (1999), p 1661. 
3   Clarida et al (1999), p 1663. 
4   Bernanke et al (1999), p 22. 
5   Taylor (1999).  
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In equation  (1), which represents the macroeconomic model of the economy,  t Y  is the vector of 
endogenous variables,  t r  is the short-term interest rate, ) , ( g L A  and  ) , ( g L B  are vector polynomials in 
the lag operator  , L and  t u  and t   are serially uncorrelated vectors of random disturbances. 
Equation (2) represents the reaction function of monetary authorities or the monetary policy rule. The 
above reaction function, a seemingly simple one, assumes that the policy variable responds to inflation 
( t  ) and the output gap ( t x ) and its own past value, and it is consistent with several monetary rules 
proposed by the literature. 
In fact, the above reaction function can be interpreted as a Taylor rule
6 according to which the 
monetary authorities react to actual inflation and the actual output gap. However, it can also be 
consistent with the inflation forecast targeting as shown by Svensson: ￿The instrument depends on 
current inflation not because current inflation is targeted (current inflation is predetermined) but 
because current inflation together with output and the exogenous variable predict future inflation.￿ 
7 
In an inflation targeting context, the ￿simple￿ rule subsumes, in reality, a complex set of economic 
behaviour and preferences. The rule is derived, in fact, from the minimisation of the loss function of the 
central bank expressing society￿s preferences about the short-term trade-off between inflation and the 
level of activity. More specifically, the arguments of the loss function are the discrepancy between 
actual inflation and the targeted inflation forecast (which monetary authorities are committed to 
achieve within a prespecified time horizon) and the deviation of the output gap from its targeted level 
(assumed to be zero). 
The inflation forecast in turn depends on a number of relevant variables (wage settlements, changes in 
the exchange rate, import prices, etc) as summarised in a potentially complex model. In this sense, 
inflation forecast targeting is consistent with a more realistic representation of the central bank￿s 
behaviour than that of the Taylor rule as it reflects the fact of life that interest rate decisions are not 
based on the observation of two variables only. More fundamentally, in an inflation targeting 
framework the reaction function describes a definitive commitment on the part of the central bank to 
achieving the target that is not implicit in the Taylor rule. 
In this framework, the most important issue facing policymakers concerns the effects on 
macroeconomic stability of different monetary policy rules. In fact, the dynamics of the main 
macroeconomic variables following a shock critically depend (for any given structural model of the 
economy) both on the variables that are included in the reaction function of the central bank and on 
the value of the parameters of the monetary policy rule.  
Concerning the latter, Taylor
8 and Clarida et al
9 show that g  1 leads to instability in the economy as 
the response of the central bank to inflation fails to increase the real interest rate and therefore to cool 
down the economy. A ￿low￿ response to inflation thus coincides with monetary accommodation. If the 
output gap is not an argument of the reaction function, the approach coincides with the strict inflation 
targeting regime where the inflation target is achieved ￿ within the time horizon chosen by the central 
bank ￿ irrespective of the consequence that this action may have on the variability of output and the 
instrument itself. Several contributions have shown that for the industrial countries a strict inflation 
targeting regime (ie when gx = 0) leads to high variability of the main economic variable and potentially 
to instrument instability.
10 If instead gx  0, the achievement of the inflation target is more gradual, as 
stated by Svensson (who assumes that the central bank is committed to achieving the inflation 
forecast target in two years): ￿The intuition for this is that always adjusting the two-year inflation 
forecast all the way to the long-run inflation target, regardless of the one-year inflation forecast, 
requires more output fluctuations. If there is a positive weight on output stabilisation, a gradual 
adjustment of the two-year inflation forecast towards the long-run inflation target reduces output 
                                                        
6   Taylor (1993).  
7   Svensson (1997), p 1119. 
8   Taylor (1999). 
9   Clarida et al (1998).  
10   See, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).  
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fluctuations. The higher the weight on output stabilisation, the slower the adjustment of the inflation 
forecast towards the long-run inflation target (the larger the coefficient).￿ 
11 
Finally, if the lagged interest rate is also present in the reaction function, there is another source of 
gradualism. In this case, the central bank achieves the ￿required￿ change in the interest rate through a 
succession of ￿small￿ steps (the central bank follows the so-called interest smoothing approach). From 
an empirical point of view, all estimated reaction functions of the main industrial countries find that the 
interest smoothing hypothesis is always validated by data and that  r g  is very high (0.8 or 0.9).
12 
One final critical issue is whether central banks should respond differently to different disturbances. 
More precisely, should central banks use the same rule to respond to supply and demand shocks? 
From a theoretical point of view, the answer to this question is clear: 
￿The simple idea is that countering demand shocks pushes both output and inflation in the right 
direction. Demand shocks do not force a short run trade-off between output and inflation.￿ 
￿Shocks to potential output also do not force a short run trade-off. But they require a quite different 
policy response. Thus, eg, a permanent rise in productivity raises potential output, but it also raises 
output demand in a perfectly offsetting manner, due to the impact on permanent income. As a 
consequence, the output gap does not change. In turn, there is no change in inflation. Thus, there is 
no reason to raise interest rates, despite the rise in output.￿ 
13  
1.2  A general representation of the Taylor rule 
This paper estimates monetary policy rules of the Taylor type following the model proposed by Clarida, 
Gal￿ and Gertler (CGG).14  
The model postulates that the central bank aims at maintaining the inflation rate equal to a 
prespecified target level (for example zero) and keeping the economy as close as possible to a neutral 
cyclical position. To achieve these objectives, the central bank uses some operating instrument. It is 
assumed, consistently with the practice of most central banks, that the main operating instrument is a 
short-term interest rate.  
It is therefore assumed that the central bank sets the target short-term interest rate 
*
t r  conditional on 
the state of the economy and that the short-term interest rate depends on the deviation of expected 
inflation and output from their respective targets, that is: 
   t t t n t t I x E I E r r         
* *    (3) 
where r  is the long-run equilibrium nominal rate,  n t   is the inflation rate between time t and time t+n, 
t x  is the real output gap and 
*   is the target level of inflation and output. The symbol E  is the 
expectation operator and  t I is the set of information available at time t. 
From Equation (3) one can derive the implied target for the ex ante real interest rate, 
  t n t t t I E r rr      as: 
     t t t n t t I x E I E rr rr          
* * 1  (4) 
where  t rr  is the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest.  
This equation explicitly shows the importance of the value of the coefficient f > 1, changes in the 
nominal rate induce changes in the real interest rate that reduce inflation; if > 0, the real interest 
                                                        
11   Svensson (1997), p 1132.  
12   See, for example, Clarida et al (1999).  
13   Clarida et al (1999), pp 1674-75. 
14   Clarida et al (1998).  
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rate is also changed to stabilise output. Conversely, if  1, changes in the nominal interest rate 
accommodate changes in inflation instead of resisting them. The reduction in the real interest rate 
derives from the fact that the monetary authorities increase the nominal interest rate by an amount that 
is insufficient to avoid the decline in the real interest rate. 
An additional desirable feature of the model is that it allows the control of inflation and the stabilisation 
of output to be identified as independent objectives. In the traditional Taylor rule model, in fact, the 
central bank reacts to actual inflation and actual output gap. In the Taylor rule type of equation, it is not 
clear that the central bank can respond independently to inflation and the output gap. For example, if 
actual inflation and the actual output gap are linked by a linear Phillips curve, responding to inflation 
implies an automatic response to the output gap as well. If, instead, expected inflation, and not actual 
inflation, enters the reaction function of the central bank, this automatic link no longer exists and the 
equation can test whether there is an independent response to the two variables in the central bank 
reaction function. The model, then, encompasses the Taylor model.  
In order to obtain an estimatable equation, the authors define 
*     r .  
Equation (3) could then be rewritten as: 
  t t t n t t I x E I E r        
* . (5)   
The authors, in addition, assume that the actual rate adjusts only gradually to the target as follows: 
 t t t t r r r        1
* 1  (6) 
where   1 , 0   . 
The parameter  captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. Several explanations of the interest 
smoothing hypothesis have been proposed in the literature: central banks move policy interest 
gradually for fear of disrupting capital markets, to avoid policy reversals, etc. The error term  t v  is a 
random shock assumed to be i.i.d.  
Combining Equation (5) with the partial adjustment equation (6) gives: 
      . 1 ) 1 ( t t t t t n t t r I x E I E r                  (7) 
The authors eliminate the unobserved forecast variables from the expression by rewriting the policy 
rule in terms of the actual output gap and the inflation forecast as follows: 
      t t t n t t r x r                   1 1 1 1  (8) 
where:           . ) 1 ( t t t t t n t n t t I x E x I E                  
The error term is a linear combination of the forecasting errors of inflation and output and the 
shock  t v . 
Finally, while it is assumed that the central bank can pursue an independent monetary policy, this 
does not imply, as mentioned before, that the central bank cannot have objectives other than inflation 
control and stabilisation of the business cycle. For example, it could aim at maintaining the real 
exchange rate within a predetermined range or it could flexibly pursue a monetary target. This implies 
that, in the equation describing how monetary authorities set the interest rate, it is possible to include 
other variables in addition to inflation and output. If  t z  denotes one such variable, equation (5) can be 
replaced by the following equation: 
   t t t t t n t t I z E I x E I E r          
* . (9) 
As noted in Section 1.1, theory suggests that central banks should respond to demand shocks but not 
to supply shocks. In addition, it was also noted that different monetary rules, for example the Taylor as 
compared with the strict Inflation Targeting rule, have different effects on the economy and on the 
instrument itself. 
These considerations therefore suggest that it is important to empirically assess: 
 the nature and the intensity of the shocks affecting emerging markets;  
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 whether there is empirical evidence that central banks in these economies react to variables 
other than just inflation and output; 
 whether different monetary policy rules (and/or the parameters of the reaction functions 
themselves) produce different effects on the economy when demand or supply shocks hit a 
country.  
2.  Supply and demand shocks affecting emerging economies 
Small open emerging economies have traditionally been exposed to significant shocks, both real and 
nominal. These disturbances may, in turn, be of domestic or foreign origin. They have conferred on the 
economies a much higher volatility than observed in industrial countries. The following paragraph tries 
to empirically identify the nature and the effects of these shocks on emerging economies. 
2.1  A SVAR model for open economies  
The importance of shocks and their nature (real and nominal) has often been invoked in the literature
15 
to explain the greater volatility in emerging economies compared with the industrial countries.  
One convenient way to assess the relative importance of real (supply and demand) and nominal 
disturbances for these economies and to estimate the effects they produce on the exchange rate and 
inflation is to estimate the structural VAR (SVAR) originally proposed by Clarida and Gal￿ (1994). One 
particularly appealing feature of this model is that it has well established theoretical foundations as it 
represents a stochastic version of the two-country model developed by Obstfeld (1985).
16  
The model aims at identifying three structural disturbances that hit the economy. The first is called 
supply shock and is meant to capture all real disturbances that have a long-run effect on output. 
Supply shocks include, for example, terms-of-trade shocks or technological changes. The second type 
of shock considered in the model is the real demand shock. It can be originated by a fiscal disturbance 
or by a change in the propensity to spend or it can arise from an exogenous change in foreign demand 
for domestic production. The third shock is called nominal (or monetary) shock. It can be interpreted 
as an exogenous change in monetary policy ￿ either domestic or foreign ￿ or in wage claims or in 
price formation. 
Assuming rational expectations and full price flexibility, Clarida and Gal￿ show that the model is lower 
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where 
e
t y  is the equilibrium level of the domestic product,  t d  is the real demand shock, 
e
t p  is the 
equilibrium price level,  t m  is the money supply, η and σ are the elasticity of output with respect to the 
real exchange rate ( t q ) and to the real interest rate respectively, and λ is the elasticity of money 
demand to the nominal interest rate. As in the Clarida-Gal￿ model, all variables, except the interest 
rate, represent domestic relative to foreign levels.  
                                                        
15   See IMF, International Capital Markets (November 1997); IMF, World Economic Outlook (May 1998), pp 80-82; Hausmann and 
Gavin (1996), p 36; Bruno (1994), pp 71-74. 
16   ￿The model not only exhibits the standard Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch results in the ￿short run￿ when prices adjust sluggishly to 
demand, money, and supply shocks, but it also embodies the ￿longer-run￿ properties that characterize macroeconomic equilibrium in 
the open economy once prices adjust fully to all shocks.￿ (Clarida and Gal￿ (1994), p 24).  
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The stochastic behaviour of the model assumes that the supply and nominal shocks are permanent 
while a fraction    of the demand shock  t   is assumed to reverse itself within one period after the 
shock. 
The model has the following long-run properties: 
(a)  the level of output is influenced only by supply shocks; 
(b)  the real exchange rate depreciates following a supply shock but appreciates as a   
consequence of a real demand shock (nominal shocks have no long-run effects on its level; 
(c)  the equilibrium level of prices is increased by real demand shocks and nominal shocks but is 
reduced by a supply shock.  
If it is assumed that after a shock the price level adjusts only gradually to the new equilibrium level, the 
short-run properties of the economy are as follows:  
(a)  the level of output depends on all three shocks; 
(b)  the real exchange rate is also affected by nominal shocks. To the extent that the effect of 
such a shock on the real exchange rate is significant, the model is consistent with the Mussa 
conjecture. It should, in addition, be noted that the model is also consistent with the 
overshooting hypothesis.   
The econometric strategy used to identify the structural shocks consists in the estimation of a 
structural VAR according to the methodology proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) that imposes 
the long-run restriction in the equations of the unrestricted VAR.  
2.1.1 Estimation  results 
The model has been estimated using the 1980-99 quarterly data for six middle-income countries in 
Latin America and Asia (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand). The data on the 
real GDP and the consumer price index have been scaled by the same variables for the United States. 
The real exchange rate is the bilateral real exchange rate vis-￿-vis the US dollar. 
The identification strategy used to estimate the structural shocks predicts the following general pattern 
for the impulse response. 
A positive supply shock gradually increases output towards a new higher steady state level. The same 
shock reduces the price level, reflecting the greater efficiency of the productive process or lower 
production costs. This in turn, by increasing competitiveness, would induce a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate (given the definition of the exchange rate ￿ quantity of foreign currency per unit of 
domestic currency ￿ in the graphs an increase (decrease) of the exchange rate signals appreciation 
(depreciation)). Supply shocks, however, may lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate if they 
reflect disturbances in the terms of trade. If the international trade of commodities represents an 
important component of the GDP, an improvement in the terms of trade would stimulate exports (and 
so output) and increase the international price of the output of the country (ie the real exchange rate). 
A positive real demand shock is expected to temporarily increase output, increase prices, due to the 
creation of excess demand, and appreciate the real exchange rate, both because of the increase in 
prices and because the demand shock would tend to increase domestic interest rates relative to the 
foreign one and this would tend to induce a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Finally, a nominal or monetary shock (such as an easing of monetary policy, a reduction in foreign 
interest rates or an increase in wage claims) is expected to temporarily increase output and prices and 
depreciate the real (and nominal) exchange rate. The impulse response can also show overshooting 
or undershooting of the exchange rate, as explained in the previous section. 
The empirical results represented in Graphs 1-2 show that the impulse responses are consistent with 
the dynamics of the theoretical model with the exception that the real exchange rate appreciates for all 
countries following a supply shock.  
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For all countries, a positive supply shock increases output to a new higher steady state level, as 
expected. The shock, however, produces for all Latin American countries an appreciation of the 
exchange rate instead of the expected depreciation. This appreciation is permanent for all countries 
except Argentina. One interpretation of this finding is that a positive supply (terms-of-trade) shock has 
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A real demand shock increases the relative price (significantly in Argentina and Brazil consistently with 
their record of being high-inflation countries) and induces an appreciation in the real exchange rate. 
One important observation is that in Argentina and Brazil the real appreciation due to a real demand 
shock is entirely attributable to the increase in the relative price as the nominal exchange rate (which 
has been mechanically derived from the log difference between the real exchange rate and the 
relative price) depreciates. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that during the period under 
review fiscal authorities lacked credibility. A fiscal expansion, therefore, led to an immediate surge of 
inflation and depreciation of the exchange rate. Concerning the effects of a real demand shock on 
output, data reveal that such a shock does not have a significant impact on real activity, except in 
Mexico and Korea.  
BIS Papers No 8  47
 
A nominal shock produces the expected effects on the real (and nominal) exchange rate along with 
inflationary pressures that, again, are particularly pronounced in Argentina and Brazil. Following a 
monetary shock, the real exchange rate depreciates on impact and remains persistently below the pre-
shock level in Latin America and Indonesia. In the other two Asian countries the increase in the 
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Furthermore, in all countries there are distinct manifestations of a variability of the real and nominal 
exchange rate (in addition to the initial overshooting). Monetary shocks thus have persistent short-term 
effects on the real exchange rate in Latin America and Indonesia in accordance with the Mussa 
conjecture. Finally, monetary shocks do not have significant effects on output, except in Mexico and 
Korea. These results give empirical support to the proposition that demand management efforts, as 
captured by the model as the effects of real demand and nominal shocks, were misguided.  
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2.2  Estimating core inflation 
Having established that the response of these economies to the main disturbances is consistent with 
the theoretical underpinnings of the model, it is possible to turn to the question of whether this 
methodology allows us to obtain a meaningful estimate of core inflation.  
There are several reasons why it is useful, for monetary policy purposes, to have a measure of 
inflation that represents underlying monetary inflation better than the change of an official price index. 
First, central banks need to distinguish between temporary or reversible price changes and trend 
inflation.
17 Second, it is important that core inflation functions as a leading indicator of future actual 
price changes. This has an implication for the choice of method to calculate core inflation as certain 
approaches provide a distorted measure of long-term inflation. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
central banks need to have a measure of inflation that reflects monetary policy actions for which they 
are responsible and accountable. This too is of critical importance for the choice of methodology as 
certain methods produce a measure of core inflation that does not distinguish between the sources of 
inflationary shocks, in particular monetary shocks.  
As a measure of core inflation, many central banks use a definition of CPI inflation that excludes 
certain categories of goods and services that are supposedly volatile. The most popular example of 
this type of definition is the ￿ex food and energy￿ price index. The risk of such an approach, however, 
is to exclude from the index components that, in fact, can contribute to trend inflation and not just to its 
short-term volatility. Therefore, this approach could lack credibility as it involves arbitrary decisions as 
to what constitutes the transitory component of inflation.  
Because of these shortcomings, a second method of measuring core inflation has been developed. It 
consists in computing a price index that uses trimmed means of the distribution of price changes.
18 
The basic motive for adopting such an approach is that the measure of core inflation obtained by 
excluding certain items is a distorted measure of the long-term price developments that matter for the 
decision-making process, as in most cases price changes have a leptokurtic distribution. Trimmed 
means measures are, instead, robust estimates of long-term inflation when price changes are skewed. 
While this approach may lead to a conceptually correct way of excluding transitory movements in 
prices that are not representative of general inflation, it nonetheless suffers from transparency and 
credibility problems as the general public may fail to understand the complex methodology with which 
such a measure is calculated. 
More importantly, these methods, and their variants, suffer from the basic shortcoming of having no 
theoretical economic justification. More precisely, they fail to provide an analytical decomposition of 
the historical profile of inflation into the components that directly reflect the effect of the different 
sources of inflation, particularly the effects of monetary policy actions, ie monetary shocks. 
Different approaches, all based on the estimation of small SVARs, have been developed for this 
purpose. A thorough review of these models is provided by Folkertsma and Hubrich (2000). It suffices 
here to recall their main features to clarify their basic differences and similarities in relation to the 
model used in this paper. 
Quah and Vahey (1995) estimate a bivariate SVAR (the endogenous variables are the changes in 
both output and the inflation rate) to quantify core inflation, which they define as the component of 
inflation that is originated by shocks not having long-term effects on real output. A basic shortcoming 
of this approach is that the model assumes super-neutrality of money with the consequence that the 
level of core inflation is undetermined. ￿If we accept that core inflation as measured by Quah and 
Vahey does in fact correspond to the component of inflation that is under the control of the monetary 
authority, and also that this component of inflation is in fact neutral with respect to output in the long 
run, it invites the question of why a central bank would ever want to be concerned about price stability. 
After all, if all the central bank controls is the price level in the long run, and if the rate at which the 
price level increases has no implications for the level of real economic activity, then one inflation rate 
                                                        
17   ￿During periods of poor weather, for example, food prices may rise to reflect decreased supply, thereby producing transitory 
increases in the aggregate index. Because these price changes do not constitute underlying monetary inflation, the monetary 
authorities should avoid basing their decisions on them.￿ (Bryan and Cecchetti (1994), p 195.)  
18   Bryan et al (1997).   
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is just as good in welfare terms as another. There is no reason to prefer a steady state inflation rate of 
2% over one of, say, 20%. Price stability or zero inflation ought not to play any particular role in the 
setting of objectives for monetary policy. Of course nobody seriously believes this.￿
19 A similar problem 
affects the three-variable SVAR (the endogenous variables of the model are the changes in real 
output and in the nominal interest rate and the level of the real interest rate) proposed by Dewachter 
and Lustig (1997) and by Blix (1995) (the three endogenous variables considered by this last author 
are the changes in real output, inflation and the level of velocity of money). The two-variable SVAR 
(changes in both output and inflation) proposed by `lvarez and Matea (1999), who identify what they 
call ￿permanent inflation￿, does not make any assumptions as regards the neutrality of money. Finally, 
money is neutral but not super-neutral in Gartner and Wehinger (1998). In their three-variable model 
(changes in output and in the nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation) they in fact identify the 
level of core inflation. 
The model used in this paper to identify real (supply and demand) and nominal shocks seems to be 
better placed than bivariate models to measure core inflation, ie the component of inflation that is 
originated by shocks ￿not having long-term effects on real output￿. The bivariate models in fact cannot 
distinguish between the inflationary effects of real demand shocks (for example fiscal shocks) from 
nominal disturbances (typically monetary policy shocks). Both disturbances have no long-term effects 
on output. Money is therefore neutral in this model. 
The model used here could provide two measures of core inflation. According to a narrow concept, 
core inflation can be computed as the change in the price due to nominal shocks only; a broader 
concept could estimate core inflation as the sum of the inflationary effects of real demand and nominal 
shocks. 
Graphs 3-8 provide the historical decomposition of the relative price changes when core inflation is 
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Graph 3:
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19   Wynne (1999), pp 12-13.  


















84 89 94 99
Graph 4:
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Graph 5:
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Two characteristics emerge from the graphs. First, the importance of ￿non-core￿ (supply) and ￿core￿ 
(demand plus nominal) shocks has changed over time. Second, policies, as captured by the core 
shocks, are more important than exogenous supply shocks in shaping the time profile of the relative 
price. This is true in Latin America, both in the first half of the 1980s (during which the relative price 
showed a falling trend) and subsequently (when the relative price increased). In Asia, this 
phenomenon is also apparent: from 1981 to 1996, the impulse coming from ￿core￿ shocks was more 
intense than that from non-core shocks, although this is not generally true for all the countries. 
Concerning Latin America, these features are particularly evident in the case of Argentina and Brazil. 
In Argentina, the contribution of core shocks follows very closely the actual price dynamics. In addition, 
the graph shows that between 1990 and 1994 policies firmed the relative price at the level that 
prevailed after the 1989-90 crisis (the corollary of this is that the decline in the actual relative price 
after 1991 is almost entirely due to supply shocks). In Brazil, this evidence is even more pronounced 
as the cycle of the relative price follows very closely the contribution of core shocks. Furthermore, the 
coincidence of the contribution of non-core shocks with the actual behaviour of the price index is 
particularly striking for Venezuela (not shown here). Mexico is an intermediate case. In fact, while non-
core shocks track actual data very closely, there is also evidence of a clear correlation of supply 
shocks contributing to the actual profile of the relative price. 
In the case of Asia, the pattern is more diversified. Core shocks almost fully explain the behaviour of 
the relative price in Thailand. The same can be said for Hong Kong and Singapore, although the 
results are not reported here. By contrast, in Korea, although the short-term changes and the cycle of 
the relative price reflect the impulses coming from core shocks, the role played by non-core shocks in 
determining the trend is very important. This is even more true in the case of Indonesia, where, on 
balance, non-core shocks appear to be dominant. 
To a very large extent these differences are not unexpected. In Latin America the empirical results 
confirm that erratic policies ￿ both monetary and fiscal ￿ have been the predominant source of 
inflation. In Asia, where by contrast more stability-oriented policies have been persistently pursued, 
















84 89 94 99
Graph 6:
Contribution Actual
Non-core shock Core shock





































































84 89 94 99
Graph 7:
Contribution Actual
Non-core shock Core shock

































































84 89 94 99
Graph 8:
Contribution Actual
Non-core shock Core shock

















































BIS Papers No 8  53
 
Despite these encouraging results, the graphs of core inflation refer to relative inflation, ie inflation in 
the country under review relative to US inflation. In order to calculate core inflation (narrow and broad), 
the model has been re-estimated without scaling the endogenous variables. In addition, by way of 
comparison, the model has been estimated for the three major industrial economies. 
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As observed above, one important motive for using the trimmed means is that the measures of core 
inflation obtained by such a statistical approach produce an unbiased estimate of the mean of the 
original series. In order to test whether model-based measures of core inflation have predictive power, 
statistical tests have been conducted (t-statistics of a VEC) to assess whether the measures of core 
inflation, obtained from the estimation of the SVAR model, are cointegrated with headline inflation. 
Table 1 reports the results of the tests.  
From the table it is clear that:  
 in the case of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia the mean of both measures of core 
inflation is way off the mark from the mean of the actual series; 
 the test of cointegration indicates that among the emerging markets the measures of core 
inflation have a predictive power only in the case of Korea and Thailand, where inflation has 
been rather stable and low for most of the period;  
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Table 1 
Headline inflation and core inflation: descriptive statistics and test for cointegration 
 Mean  Standard  deviation  t-statistic on 
coefficient of VEC
 
United States (1980-95)       
Headline inflation  3.69  1.15   
Core (narrow)  3.73  0.67  ￿1.65 
Core (broad)  3.69  1.02  ￿5.13 
Japan (1980-95)       
Headline inflation  1.58  1.13   
Core (narrow)  1.67  0.53  ￿3.35 
Core (broad)  1.64  0.91  ￿2.25 
Germany (1980-95)       
Headline inflation  2.66  1.64   
Core (narrow)  2.76  1.58  ￿15.91 
Core (broad)  2.69  1.49  ￿11.25 
Argentina (1980-99)       
Headline inflation  705.87  2,560.41   
Core (narrow)  38.17  105.91  ￿6.06 
Core (broad)  44.38  114.18  ￿8.31 
Brazil (1980-99)       
Headline inflation  722.91  1,184.11   
Core (narrow)  111.39  516.46  ￿1.15 
Core (broad)  72.64  417.88  1.36 
Mexico (1980-99)       
Headline inflation  47.86  41.16   
Core (narrow)  ￿42.82  217.36  1.76 
Core (broad)  1,410.99  12,683.57  ￿1.46 
Korea (1980-99)       
Headline inflation  4.98  2.39   
Core (narrow)  5.01  1.93  ￿8.04 
Core (broad)  5.01  2.10  ￿7.52 
Indonesia (1980-98)       
Headline inflation  11.58  14.06   
Core (narrow)  101.15  173.81  ￿1.69 
Core (broad)  ￿15.39  937.02  ￿0.35 
Thailand (1980-99)       
Headline inflation  4.11  2.25   
Core (narrow)  4.05  1.79  ￿2.91 
Core (broad)  4.00  1.74  ￿4.90 
Note: Core (narrow) is measured as the baseline plus the nominal shock and Core (broad) as the baseline plus nominal and 
real demand shock.  
 for the three Latin American countries, as well as for Indonesia, the presence of episodes of 
hyperinflation biases the estimation of the model and the measures of core inflation show a 
dynamics that is significantly different from that of headline inflation (Graphs 9 and 10). The 
model, in fact, generates arbitrary peaks for some countries because for some countries it 
fails to correctly identify the nature of the shock that generates extreme inflation values; 
 in the case of the G3 (Graph  11), estimated measures of core inflation show statistical 
properties (particularly in the case of the broad measure of core inflation) that may warrant 
their use as an operational target for monetary policy purposes. In fact, both core inflation 
measures have almost the same mean of, and appear to be cointegrated with, headline 
inflation.  
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In conclusion, the use of small-scale SVAR to compute measures of core inflation for emerging 
markets is not appropriate in all cases where episodes of hyperinflation have punctuated the history of 
the country. In these cases in fact the measures of core inflation produce a biased estimate of the 
mean of actual inflation and core inflation measures do not have predictive power for future inflation. 
3.  The Taylor rule for open economies 
A large number of emerging economies in both Latin America and Asia have recently moved away 
from rigid exchange rate regimes. According to the official classification, they are defined as ￿floaters￿; 
this tends to establish the presumption that the behaviour of the exchange rate has little or no 
influence on the setting of interest rates.   
Recent research has, however, shown that the main features of the exchange rate dynamic of these 
countries differ from those of true floaters. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) document that the dynamics of 
some critical variables of emerging economies reveal that they try to voluntarily minimise exchange 
rate volatility. In their words these countries exhibit fear of floating. 
There are at least three basic reasons why emerging economies may wish to avoid ￿excessive￿ 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
One consists in the fact that emerging economies are characterised by a large pass-through of 
devaluation into inflation.
20 High indexation de jure or de facto implies that even temporary 
devaluations are translated into persistent higher inflation: in the extreme case of full indexation, an 
inflationary shock may determine a shift to a significantly higher and permanent inflation rate.
21 
A second reason, clear evidence of which has been provided by the recent wave of crises in both 
Latin America and Asia, is that devaluation may significantly weaken the balance sheets of both banks 
and firms. Thus, significant swings in the exchange rate may lead to systemic financial crises and 
deep recessions, in addition to inflation. 
Third, for countries with a large external debt denominated in foreign currency, devaluation may 
seriously undermine the fiscal position besides negatively impacting on the fragile balance sheet of the 
private sector. Again, this may induce a recession and/or a higher rate of inflation.  
                                                        
20   For an indication of this in the case of Mexico, see Ortiz (2000).  
21   On this point, see Bruno (1994).  
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From an empirical standpoint, in their review of the functioning of the exchange rate regime of a large 
number of emerging countries, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) find that: 
 the variability of the exchange rate of these economies is lower than that of the true floaters; 
 the variability of foreign reserves is high, which the authors take as evidence of attempts to 
lean against the wind through interventions in the foreign exchange markets; 
 the volatility of short-term interest rates is high, indicating that monetary policy systematically 
responds to exchange rate changes; 
 the correlation between the exchange and interest rates is positive, while that between 
foreign currency reserves and the exchange rate is negative. The authors interpret this 
empirical regularity as additional evidence that monetary authorities both intervene and use 
monetary policy to limit exchange rate fluctuations.  
In sum, the primary conclusion reached by the authors is that countries that have exited from a rigid 
exchange rate regime have nonetheless tried to avoid clean floating. Their behaviour, rather, seems to 
be closer to that of countries managing non-credible pegs.  
A parallel study that compares the post-crisis dynamics of the exchange rate of Asian countries
22 
comes to broadly similar conclusions. The authors find sufficient empirical evidence to support the 
hypothesis that, despite the greater post-crisis flexibility of the exchange rate regime, Asian countries 
have not gone as far as allowing the exchange rate to float freely. Countries, in fact, have tried to 
stabilise high-frequency exchange rate variability, to slow the pace of appreciation after the sharp 
devaluation due to the crisis, and finally they have accumulated ample precautionary foreign currency 
reserves. As in the case of the Calvo-Reinhart findings, the evidence is that these countries have 
deliberately tried to remain in the middle of the continuum of exchange rate regimes and away from 
either corner solutions.  
In the case of the countries studied in this paper, the evidence of fear of floating is however mixed. 
Table  2 reports the variability (measured by the standard deviation of monthly data) of various 
measures of the exchange rate, inflation and the short-term interest rate together with simple 
correlation coefficients between the short-term interest rate and the other variables. These statistics 
have been computed for different subperiods (except for Chile) to reflect the behaviour prevailing at 
different points in time before and after the crises that hit these countries. 
Concerning the pre- and post-crisis variability of exchange rates, there is distinct evidence that 
volatility has increased since countries decided to abandon peg arrangements. The only exception to 
this pattern seems to be Mexico and Brazil. But here it is evident that the enormous volatility of any 
measure of the exchange rate in these two countries during the 1980s likely reflects the lack of 
discipline of macroeconomic policies rather than serving as evidence of the inherent variability of 
floating exchange rate regimes. In the case of Asian countries, the shift from the hard pegs of the 
1990s to the more flexible post-crisis exchange rate framework is, instead, clear-cut (with the 
exception, of course, of Malaysia, which in 1999 adopted a hard peg to the dollar). 
By contrast, there is not much evidence of any positive link between devaluation and changes in the 
interest rates. In the majority of cases the correlations are low, not significant and/or have the wrong 
sign. Evidence of fear of floating is only significant for Brazil and Mexico, particularly for the latter 
country.  
Simple statistics are, however, a weak tool to establish whether central banks systematically react to 
exchange rate movements through change in interest rates. The assumption that this may indeed be 
the case seems to be validated by the findings presented in Section 2.1.1, namely that nominal and 
real shocks have a significant impact on inflation, output and exchange rates (both nominal and real). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the Taylor rule that is appropriate for large countries with 
limited exposure to foreign shocks has to be modified to properly fit small open economy 
circumstances. 
                                                        
22   Hernandez and Montiel (2001).  
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Table 2 
Short-term interest and exchange rates 
Variability
1  Correlation of changes in interest rate 
Country 
   US$     NER     RER     R  INF     US$     NER     RER  INF 
Brazil  80:01 94:07 10.5  10.8  4.4  11,894.6 44.3  0.012  0.023  0.182  ￿0.051 
  96:01  98:09  0.1 1.0 1.1  5.0  1.8  0.257  0.386  0.418  ￿0.341 
  99:01  00:12  7.6 7.7 7.5  3.3  2.2  0.498  0.465  0.444  0.392 
Chile  82:10  00:12  2.1 2.5 2.6  9.0  6.3 ￿0.035  0.043  ￿0.040  0.221 
Mexico  80:01  94:07  5.9 6.0 5.0  7.4  10.5  0.165  0.163  0.097  0.178 
  96:01  00:12  2.2 2.4 2.5  3.0  3.0  0.762  0.748  0.772  ￿0.231 
Indonesia  80:01  97:06  2.9 3.2 3.1  1.3  3.2 ￿0.011  0.037  0.053  ￿0.055 
  99:01  00:12  6.8 7.1 6.9  2.1  4.0 ￿0.001  ￿0.023  ￿0.033  0.120 
Korea  80:01  97:06  0.9 1.5 1.6  1.1  2.9  0.004  ￿0.147  ￿0.176  0.074 
  99:01  00:12  1.7 1.8 1.8  0.2  2.0 ￿0.101  ￿0.054  ￿0.014  ￿0.078 
Malaysia 80:01  97:06  1.2 1.2 1.3  0.4  1.7  0.139  0.067  0.046  0.156 
  99:01  00:12  0.0 0.9 1.0  0.3  1.2    na  ￿0.091  ￿0.138  ￿0.046 
Thailand 80:01  97:06  1.2 1.6 1.7  1.7  2.4 ￿0.028  ￿0.069  ￿0.040  ￿0.054 
  99:01  00:12  1.8 2.1 2.1  0.4  1.2  0.137  0.217  0.184  0.328 
1 Standard deviation of change of the US dollar exchange rate, nominal and real effective rate (NER and RER), short-term 
interest rate (R) and inflation (INF). 
 
Ball (2000) argues in favour of the inclusion of a measure of the real exchange rate in the reaction 
function of monetary authorities of countries exposed to foreign shocks on the basis of the following 
simple model: 
t t t t t e r x x         1 1 1 d b a      
t t t t t e x            ) ( 1 1 1 g f     
t t t v r e    h . 
The first equation is a standard IS curve for open economies according to which output ( t x ) is boosted 
(reduced) by the devaluation (appreciation) of the lagged real exchange rate  ) ( 1  t e . 
The second equation is a standard Phillips curve where changes in the exchange rate affect inflation 
) ( t  according to a pass-through coefficient g.  
The third equation reflects the hypothesis that increases in the real interest rate  ) ( t r  attract capital 
flows and lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate (in the notation used here the exchange rate is 
defined as national currency per unit of foreign currency). 
From this model the author derives the following modified Taylor rule that minimises a weighted sum 
of inflation and output:  
t t t t e x r       
* . 
The modified Taylor rule has a number of interesting features.  
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The first is that  1
*
    t t e g   , ie the target rate of inflation now represents ￿a measure of inflation 
that excludes the transitory effects of exchange rate fluctuations￿.
23 One can think of this definition in 
terms of the central bank targeting a measure of domestic inflation. In so doing, the central bank is 
reacting to exchange rate changes not because of movements in the currency per se but because 
changes in the external value of the currency generate long-term inflation. Implicitly, the modified rule 
says that the central bank should not react to transitory movements in the exchange rate. This 
behaviour, in addition, would prevent the central bank from tightening aggressively in response to 
changes in the exchange rate. In fact, ￿by construction, 
*   is unaffected by temporary exchange rate 
movements, so 
*   targeters have no incentive to move exchange rates aggressively￿.
24 
Accordingly, an equation similar to that obtained by Ball has been estimated to empirically verify 
whether, and to what extent, the countries under review have reacted to exchange rate changes. 
3.1 Estimation  results 
Equation (8) is analytically derived by making three important assumptions, namely that the central 
bank can independently change its operating instruments (normally short-term interest rates), that 
price stability is the primary objective of monetary policy, and that no significant change in the 
monetary and/or exchange rate regime has taken place within the estimation period. It is fair to say 
that in most of the countries under review these implicit assumptions are not verified. In addition, in 
some countries, the data set includes serious outliers because countries experienced either repeated 
periods of hyperinflation or serious crises. For all these reasons the estimation results that are 
presented in Table 3 have to be viewed with caution as the violation of any of the assumptions on 
which the theoretical model is based or the presence of extreme data may distort the estimates. 
To deal with the outliers, the specification of the equations for Brazil and Peru has been changed. The 
dependent variable of the equation is the logarithm of the short-term interest rate as this variable 
exhibits a strong correlation with both inflation and changes in the exchange rate (the US dollar). The 
logarithm of the short-term rate, in other words, seems to capture much better than the short-term rate 
itself the intensity with which both countries have responded to hyperinflation and the sharp 
devaluation of the currency. On these occasions, in fact, both countries show a disproportionate 
increase in the real interest rate that has no equivalent in any other country and the timing of changes 
in the interest rate coincides with the timing of major devaluation episodes.  
According to this specification it then appears that the reaction of the central bank to rapidly changing 
circumstances is highly non-linear as the interest rate, in response to the same increase in inflation or 
the same devaluation, is increased by an amount that is higher, the higher the prevailing interest rate. 
In the case of Brazil, the long-term semi-elasticity of inflation is equal to 1.45 in the first equation. This 
result seems consistent with the experience where between 1989 and 1990 and prior to 1994 the real 
short-term interest rate increased enormously. The second equation for Brazil (estimated using 
instrumental variables) shows two interesting features. First, the interest rate is increased with no lag 
when inflation rises or when the currency is devalued (the lagged dependent variable is not 
significant). Second, short-term rates seem to respond with a much greater intensity to currency 
devaluation than to surges in inflation. It is possible, however, that this result, rather than being 
reflective of a precise policy strategy, critically depends on the fact that, for example in 1994 and in 
1990, when the currency devaluation stops, the short-term interest rate has declined sharply. 
The two equations for Peru exhibit features similar to those of Brazil as far as the response of interest 
rates to inflation is concerned. In the case of Peru, in addition, there is evidence that interest rates 
respond to the development of monetary aggregates, a feature that has been observed for industrial 
countries as well. An (excessive) increase in money demand is countered by an increase in interest 
rates. 
                                                        
23   Ball (2000), p 3. 
24   Ball (2000), p 5.  
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Table 3 
Estimated elasticities of Taylor rule type equations 
for selected emerging economies 
Long-run elasticities 
Countries  Equation 
number    1 x  
2       R
2 
Brazil
3         
  TSLS  1  0.83 1.84  ￿0.03 0.00 0.916 
  OLS  2  1.45 1.96 0.00 0.33 0.880 
Chile         
  TSLS  3  1.02 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.869 
  OLS  4  1.19 1.96  ￿0.53 0.37 0.796 
Mexico         
  TSLS  5  0.95 1.86 0.00 0.62 0.838 
  OLS  6  0.72 0.00  ￿0.43 0.53 0.894 
Peru
3         
 TSLS  7  1.72  11.50  0.01
4 0.77  0.886 
  OLS  8  1.20 2.02 0.00 0.60 0.925 
Korea         
  TSLS  9  0.76 1.42  ￿0.17 0.75 0.780 
  OLS  10  0.35 0.52  ￿0.19 0.72 0.850 
Malaysia         
 TSLS  11  1.11  0.37  ￿0.07
5 0.87  0.846 
 OLS  12  0.63  0.37  ￿0.06
5 0.87  0.860 
1 Output gap in the case of Chile and Korea. For all other countries, change in real output.  
2 Short-term elasticity of the 
change in the dollar exchange rate.  
3 The dependent variable is the log of the short-term interest rate.  
4 US$-1.  
5 US$-2. 
 
The equation that includes among the explanatory variables the change in money demand, however, 
exhibits a puzzling result regarding the response to changes in the dollar value of the currency. The 
equation indicates that, after controlling for inflation and changes in money demand, the central bank 
leans with the wind rather than against. This result requires further investigation. 
For the other countries (Mexico, Chile, Korea and Malaysia) the Taylor rule type of equation has been 
estimated.  
From the estimated equations, it emerges that the change in the nominal interest rate in response to 
inflation is greater (in the longer run) than the change in inflation itself (ie the central bank induces an 
increase in the real interest rate) only in Chile and Malaysia. In both these countries, in addition, there 
is clear evidence that interest rates had been increased in response to currency devaluation and to a 
weakening of the cyclical position. The response to an increase in the output gap is particularly 
pronounced in the case of Chile. 
Concerning the sensitivity of interest rates to changes in inflation in Mexico and Korea, the estimates 
indicate that interest rates were increased on average by less than the increase in inflation. By 
contrast, both countries exhibit a strong response of monetary policy to exchange rate changes in 
accordance with the importance they have traditionally assigned to exchange rate stability. However, 
the changes in the exchange rate regime that have occurred in Mexico and Korea (as in all economies 
considered in this study) make it difficult to precisely quantify the extent to which the central bank 
responds to domestically induced price changes and to deviation of the exchange rate from ￿target￿. In 
other words, the changes in the monetary regime may bias the empirical assessment of the relative 
importance assigned by the central bank to domestic equilibrium (price stability) and to external 
equilibrium (exchange rate stability). 
One general characteristic emerges from the estimates. In all countries short-term rates respond with 
the correct sign to exchange rate changes. Prima facie this can be taken as evidence that central 
banks react to the inflationary effects of devaluations and not necessarily to the fear that devaluations  
60  BIS Papers No 8
 
may generate serious balance sheet problems. This is because the results of the SVAR estimates 
indicate clearly that nominal and real demand shocks have powerful effects on inflation but not on 
output. 
4.  The effects of supply and demand shocks under alternative monetary 
rules 
For the industrial countries ￿ indeed mostly for the United States ￿ there is an extensive empirical 
literature that provides estimates of monetary policy rules and model simulations that quantify the 
effects that the adoption of such rules produces on the main macroeconomic variables. There is, on 
the other hand, very limited empirical evidence on the same topic for the developing countries. This is 
obviously a consequence of the fact that developing countries have in general not followed such 
monetary rules and that, as already observed, emerging economies have experienced several 
changes in their monetary regime. To start filling this gap, the focus of this section is to empirically 
assess the consequences for inflation, output and the interest rate itself of the use of alternative 
monetary ￿rules￿ in response to shocks. To this end, a small macroeconomic VAR model has been 
estimated for two of the countries that have adopted either inflation targeting (Korea) or a monetary 
standard that, while based on money supply control (Mexico), is equivalent to an inflation targeting 
regime. Implicitly, the estimation of the SVAR would provide an empirical measure of the extent to 
which the transmission mechanism in these countries would permit an effective implementation of 
inflation targeting. By way of comparison, the same simulation exercise is also conducted for the euro 
area. 
The model used here is that employed by Gerlach and Smets (1995) in their study of the transmission 
mechanism in the G7 countries. The model has three endogenous variables: real output, the 
consumer price and the nominal short-term rate.
25 The three-equation model is a highly stylised 
representation of the economy. The output equation is to be understood as the IS curve, the price 
equation is a Phillips curve and the interest rate equation is the reaction function of monetary 
authorities. The identification strategy uses a combination of long-run and contemporaneous 
restrictions. Only supply shocks determine in the long run the level of real output, as in the SVAR used 
in the previous section. The model used for this exercise, however, is also based on the assumption 
that monetary policy shocks do not have contemporaneous effects on output but can instantaneously 
affect prices. Concerning the reaction function of the central bank (the interest rate equation of the 
SVAR), the assumption is that monetary authorities respond to movements in output and prices only. 
This equation is therefore consistent with most of the Taylor-type equations proposed in the literature. 
One weakness of applying such an approach to small open economies is that such a reaction function 
postulates that the central bank does not respond to exchange rate movements that are not due to 
supply or demand shocks.  
After having estimated the model, the analysis of the effects of both supply and demand shocks on the 
economy under alternative monetary policy rules has been conducted by replacing the interest rate 
equation of the SVAR with alternative policy rules whose basic parameters have been independently 
estimated as in the case of the euro area and Mexico or imposed a priori. The arbitrary values of the 
parameters of the monetary rules have been set as follows:  
 the ￿Taylor￿ rule, according to which the interest rate is increased by 1.5 percentage points in 
response to a 1% increase in inflation and by 1% in response to a 1% increase in output. 
Using the symbols of the parsimonious model briefly described in Section 1.1, it is assumed 
that   g = 1.5 and  x g = 1; 
 the ￿Strict I.T.￿ rule, where   g = 1.5 and  x g = 0; 
 the ￿Very Strict I.T.￿ rule, where   g = 3 and  x g = 0;  
                                                        
25   It should be noted that the variable representing the volume of activity is real GDP and not the output gap, as in most empirical work 
on this topic. This is due to the fact that no reliable measure of the output gap exists for the emerging economies.    
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 the ￿Slow Adjustment￿ Taylor rule, which assumes that the monetary authorities adopt an 
￿interest smoothing￿ approach. This is accomplished by adding to the Taylor rule the lagged 
value of the short-term interest rate with a coefficient equal to 0.9 and modifying accordingly 
the short-term coefficients of inflation and the change in output in order to have their long-run 
values equal to 1.5 and 1, respectively. 
The nature of the exercise conducted here is different from the typical approach of the research on the 
optimal monetary policy rules. In the latter line of research, the purpose is to identify the optimal rule ￿ 
as well as those that better proxy it ￿ as the rule that minimises the variability of certain 
macroeconomic magnitudes (normally output and inflation) given the macroeconomic model and the 
preferences of the central banks. Here, instead, the purpose is to squarely focus on two issues: 
 whether, given the macroeconomic model, the central bank￿s response should depend on 
the nature of the shock; 
 whether alternative rules yield different economic outcomes mainly, but not exclusively, 
evaluated in terms of the stabilisation of the price level after a shock that the rules 
themselves make it possible to attain. As far as price stability is concerned, a rule can be 
regarded as being better than an alternative only if it permits greater long-term price 
reduction after a positive supply shock and a lower price level increase after a demand 
shock. 
Before entering into the details of the results, it seems appropriate to note that in general there is a 
distinct instability in the estimates of the SVAR. This is no surprise as it is well known that the 
countries in question, perhaps with the partial exception of Korea, have changed their monetary 
regime several times in the sample period considered here. Furthermore, crises have characterised 
these economies and it is well known that VAR models are particularly sensitive to the presence of 
outliers in the value of the endogenous variables.  
4.1  Euro area  
The first experiment consists in comparing the impulse response function using the ￿Taylor￿ and ￿Strict 
I.T.￿ rules with the results obtained using the ￿Model￿ interest rate equation (see Graph 12).
26  
In the euro area, both a ￿Taylor￿ and a ￿Strict I.T.￿ rule produce higher (but more variable) output levels 
than the ￿Model￿ in the case of positive supply shocks before approaching new, common, equilibrium 
levels. However, the same rules yield suboptimal results as far as inflation is concerned, as the long-
term price reduction due to the supply shock is far less than in the estimated ￿Model￿ response. The 
same rules, however, perform better than the ￿Model￿ rule as they contain inflation more successfully 
than the ￿Model￿ in the case of a demand shock. This implies, however, that interest rates have to be 
increased far more than in the ￿Model￿.  
Graph 12 also illustrates a different experiment. The ￿Model￿ reaction function is replaced by two other 
estimated equations. The two equations are estimated with the GMM ￿ using the Clarida-Gal￿-Gertler 
(1998) approach from two different periods, the ￿pre-ERM￿ period (1980-86) and the ￿post-ERM￿ 
period (1997-98). 
The estimated results ￿ not reported here ￿ show a significant difference, particularly as far as the 
magnitude of the response of interest rates to inflation (  g ) is concerned. In the ￿pre-ERM￿ equation, 
the long-run response to inflation in the reaction function is well below unity (  g = 0.72), signalling that 
on average the then non-existent euro area was following an accommodating monetary policy. This 
result is reversed in the ￿post-ERM￿ equation, where   g = 2.18. 
                                                        
26   In the case of Mexico and Korea, the attempt at estimating a reaction function ￿ la Taylor has not produced meaningful results.  
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When these two equations are used in the SVAR, the impulse responses confirm the Taylor/Clarida-
Gal￿-Gertler assertions that   g  1 leads to instability after an inflationary demand shock. The ￿pre-
ERM￿ path of the price level, in fact, tends to diverge and the increase in output declines more 
gradually relative to the path of the ￿post-ERM￿ simulation. By contrast, the ￿post-ERM￿ rule stabilises 
the price level after the shock (at a level that is lower than ￿Model￿) and better contains output because 
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Graph 12:
Quarters following the shock (shock = 0)
Model Taylor Strict Pre-ERM Post-ERM
Output Price index Nominal interest rate


























The ￿post-ERM￿ rule, however, is outperformed by the ￿Taylor￿ rule. By following the ￿Taylor￿ rule, 
there would be a faster reduction in excess demand and the steady state price level increase would be 
half that obtained with the ￿post-ERM￿ rule as the increase in the interest rate in the ￿post-ERM￿ case 
is almost three times that of the ￿pre-ERM￿ regime. 
4.2 Korea 
In the case of Korea (see Graph 13), the sample period has been shortened to eliminate the 1997-98 
outliers. 
If the estimated reaction function is replaced by alternative rules, the following results are obtained. 
￿Strict I.T.￿ and ￿Slow Adjustment￿ Taylor rules invariably produce worse results than the ￿Model￿ as 
far as inflation is concerned. In the case of supply shock the decline in prices is much more contained 
than in the ￿Model￿ and, following a demand shock, neither rule succeeds in reducing the price level 
after the initial increase as the estimated reaction function does. Two years after the shock, in fact, the 
price level stabilised at approximately the peak level, while the ￿Model￿ response shows a significant 
reduction after the initial sharp rise. 
A ￿Very Strict I.T.￿ rule approximates, as far as inflation is concerned, more closely the ￿Model￿ 
response in the case of a demand shock, but this happens at the expense of much increased 
variability in all three variables of the model. In the case of supply shocks, this rule is even less 
efficient than the other two, as it increases instrument instability without producing any additional 
benefit in terms of output or inflation.   
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Graph 13:
Quarters following the shock (shock = 0)
Model Slow Strict Very strict
Output Price index Nominal interest rate



























The simulation exercise differs, for Mexico, from that carried out in the case of Korea and the euro 
area. 
In addition to the comparison of the ￿Model￿ with the Taylor rule, the effects of supply and real demand 
shocks have been simulated using the reaction function estimated with TSLS (Equation 5 in Table 3). 
To further explore the issue of whether a stronger interest rate response to inflation would be effective 
in reducing inflation and increase the volatility of the economy, the estimated parameters of the 
monetary rule have been modified as follows: 
(a)  in the Variant to TSLS (1) the short-term elasticity of inflation has been kept constant but the 
speed of adjustment has been halved. This amounts to halving the long-run inflation 
elasticity; 
(b)  in the Variant to TSLS (2) the short-term elasticity of inflation has been doubled, leaving 
unchanged the speed of adjustment (this amounts to doubling the long-term elasticity of 
inflation). 
The results of these experiments are illustrated in Graph 14. 
After a supply shock, the model yields a significant increase in output and a parallel reduction in the 
interest rate (nominal and real) and in the price level. If the interest rate equation of the model is 
replaced either by the Taylor rule or by the independently estimated reaction function, the price level 
does not fall in any significant way. 
In the case of a demand shock, by contrast, the Taylor rule (but not the TSLS estimated reaction 
function) yields a better (lower) profile for the price level than the ￿Model￿ for most of the simulation 
period.  
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To test whether a stronger response of the nominal interest rate to inflation would allow a better 
containment of inflation following a demand shock, the short-run price elasticity of the estimated TSLS 
reaction function was doubled (leaving unchanged the parameters of the speed of adjustment). In 
doing so, the long-run elasticity of the policy instrument is doubled. Surprisingly, this change would 
worsen the inflationary effects of demand shocks (see response TSLS (2) in the graph). The result is 
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Graph 14:
Quarters following the shock (shock = 0)
Model Taylor Two-stage least squares (TSLS) Variant to TSLS (1) Variant to TSLS (2)
Output Price index Nominal interest rate


























Vice versa, by halving the speed of adjustment of interest rates and leaving unchanged the response 
of the interest rate to inflation (which amounts to halving the long-run elasticity of the policy instrument 
to inflation and output), the inflation performance is better. The price level increase under this policy 
rule is less than under any other rule (see response TSLS (1) in the graph). The puzzling result is due 
to the dynamic structure of the model, particularly to the strong autoregressive component of inflation 
in the Phillips curve and in the positive coefficient of the lagged interest rate in this equation. 
One (preliminary) conclusion that can be drawn from this result is that, in an economy characterised 
by significant inflation inertia, mere monetary tightening would not prove to be sufficient to effectively 
contain inflationary shocks. A more aggressive monetary policy, in this case, may lead to suboptimal 
results when the process generating inflation is strongly influenced by the past accommodative stance 
of policies. 
Two main conclusions can be inferred from the simulation results obtained: 
 the central bank should not follow the same rule irrespective of the nature of the shocks. In 
the case of a supply shock, in particular, the central bank should not contrast the increase in 
output by increasing the interest rate (at most, it should aim to decrease it to facilitate both 
the growth of output and the decline in prices); 
 the conclusion reached in empirical studies on the industrial countries concerning the 
potentially higher variability that the ￿Strict I.T.￿ rule may induce is confirmed, but this 
approach is not necessarily more effective than other ￿milder￿ rules in containing inflation as 
the simulations for Korea and Mexico indicate.   
BIS Papers No 8  65
 
Summary and conclusions 
The main motivation of this paper has been to ascertain whether the use of small macroeconomic 
models helps to answer three critical questions for the conduct of monetary policy in those emerging 
markets that have assigned to monetary policy the primary objective of attaining and maintaining price 
stability and that have abandoned a rigid exchange rate regime. 
The first question is whether a model-based approach would allow the estimation of a measure of 
inflation that recovers the core inflation process and provides a reasonable means of extracting price 
changes that are due to monetary policy actions. There are several methods of measuring core 
inflation. Among them, univariate time series methodologies (such as moving average or Kalman 
filters) and techniques that exclude temporary or volatile changes in certain prices (the ex-food and 
energy price measures or the trimmed mean estimators) are the most popular approaches. At the 
same time, however, they all fail to distinguish price developments that are due to changes in the 
monetary policy stance ￿ ie price developments for which monetary authorities are held accountable ￿ 
from price changes that depend on factors, such as terms-of-trade changes, that are beyond the 
control of those authorities. 
Small SVARs have been used by several authors to identify the effects on prices of monetary policy 
for several industrial countries. Following such an approach, the paper estimates core inflation for a 
selected number of mature emerging markets using a model that exhibits the theoretical properties of 
a two-country macro model of the Mundell-Fleming type. To ascertain the validity of the approach, the 
paper tests whether on average the measure of core inflation so obtained is an unbiased estimate of 
headline inflation and whether core inflation is cointegrated with actual inflation. 
Both tests are passed only in two cases: Korea and Thailand, where inflation has been relatively low 
and stable for most of the past two decades. For all the other countries under review, the presence of 
episodes of hyperinflation biases the estimation of the model. In addition, the model creates a 
measure of core inflation affected by arbitrary outliers, presumably due to the inability of the model to 
correctly identify the exact nature of the shocks that in the past have determined the occurrence of 
hyperinflation. This contrasts with the case of the G3 where tests are passed. 
The second question consists in assessing empirically whether the reaction function of monetary 
authorities can be described by the Taylor rule type of equation and in ascertaining to what extent the 
inflationary process has been accommodated or resisted by central banks. 
Despite the changes in the monetary regimes, the estimates show that monetary policy in Chile, 
Mexico, Korea and Malaysia can be explained by reaction functions similar to the Taylor rule. In the 
case of Mexico and Malaysia these reaction functions indicate that central banks have been forward-
looking. In the case of Chile and Malaysia, the empirical evidence shows that monetary policy has not 
accommodated inflation, while this does not seem to be the case for Mexico and Korea. For all the 
countries under review, however, there is also evidence that monetary authorities strongly reacted to 
changes in the exchange rate (consistently with the importance attached by these economies to its 
stability during part of the sample period). Of course, the change in monetary regimes makes it difficult 
to assess precisely the relative importance that these countries attached to price stability or to external 
equilibrium. 
For Brazil and Peru, by contrast, the Taylor rule is not capable of explaining the behaviour of the short-
term interest rate. To capture the high non-linear response of the interest rate to the sharp devaluation 
and extreme inflation that have characterised these countries during the 1980s and the 1990s, the 
equation has been estimated using the logarithm of the dependent variable. With this modification, the 
equation seems to capture relatively well the fact that interest rates in Brazil and Peru have been 
increased during periods of extreme tension by an amount that was higher, the higher the level of the 
interest rate preceding monetary policy actions. 
Finally, a small SVAR has been estimated to describe the monetary policy transmission in these 
countries and to deal with the third issue, which concerns the macroeconomic effect of the adoption of 
alternative monetary policy rules. 
Despite data problems and the regime changes, the small SVAR suggests that the transmission 
mechanism in the small number of economies studied here is very similar to that of industrial 
economies. Supply shocks increase output and decrease the price level and the real interest rate very 
much in the same way as in the major industrial economies. Demand shocks increase output 
temporarily and produce significant inflationary pressures, particularly in Latin American countries.  
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More importantly, these estimates confirm the theoretical proposition that monetary authorities should 
not respond to (or even accommodate) supply shocks but instead resist the inflationary pressures of 
demand shocks. 
According to the theoretical results obtained by several authors ￿ and validated empirically for some 
industrial countries ￿ a stronger response of interest rates to inflation ￿ or an exclusive focus on 
inflation by the central bank ￿ yields a better inflation performance after a shock, at the price, however, 
of greater variability in both real output and interest rates. 
The simulation of alternative rules for Korea and Mexico do not conform to these theoretical 
propositions. In the case of Korea an exclusive focus on inflation (and/or a stronger response of 
interest rates than prescribed by the Taylor rule) yields an inflation performance that is not better than 
that of other rules while generating a much higher variability in output and, endogenously, in the 
interest rate itself. 
In the case of Mexico a better inflation containment following a demand shock is obtained not by 
increasing the response to inflation, but rather by accelerating the speed of adjustment of the interest 
rate to inflation. These results for Mexico are likely to be determined by the estimation of the model 
over a time span that includes periods of accommodative policy and episodes of sharp devaluation. 
But they may be taken as illustrative of the fact that changes in the monetary regimes may produce 
effects only to the extent to which the endurance of a stability-oriented monetary policy would 
progressively change the inflationary process. 
The final conclusion that can be drawn from the simulation results is that the central bank should not 
follow the same rule irrespective of the nature of the shocks. In the case of a supply shock, in 
particular, the central bank should not contrast the increase in output by increasing the interest rate (at 
most, it should aim to decrease it to facilitate both the growth of output and the decline in prices).  
An important caveat is, however, in order. The estimations of both the model and the reaction function 
are very sensitive to the choice of the sample period, to the estimation method and to the variables 
used as instruments. This is particularly the case where data contain extreme values of the type that 
have occurred on the occasion of the recent (and less recent) currency and banking crises and when 
important regime shifts have taken place.  
BIS Papers No 8  67
 
References 
`lvarez, L J and M de los Llanos Matea (1999): ￿Underlying inflation measures in Spain￿. Documento 
e Trabajo, 9911. Banco de Espaæa. 
Ball, Laurence (2000): ￿Policy rules and external shocks￿. National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper, 7910, September. 
Bernanke, Ben S, Thomas Laubach, Frederic S Mishkin and Adam S Posen  (1999): ￿Inflation 
targeting: lessons from the international experience￿. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press.   
Blanchard, O and D Quah (1989): ￿The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply 
disturbances￿. American Economic Review, 79, pp 655-73.  
Blix, M (1995): ￿Underlying inflation - a common trends approach￿. Arbetsrapport, 23. Sveriges 
Riksbank.  
Bruno, Michael (1994): ￿Inflazione, crescita e controllo monetario: lezioni non lineari dalla crisi e dalla 
ripresa￿. Banca d￿Italia, Lezioni Paolo Baffi di Moneta e Finanza, Roma, 4 November.   
Bryan, Michael F and Stephen G Cecchetti (1994): ￿Measuring core inflation￿ in Mankiw, N Gregory 
(ed), Monetary policy, pp 195-215. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Bryan, Michael F, Stephen G Cecchetti and Rodney L Wiggins II (1997): ￿Efficient inflation estimation￿ 
in Bank for International Settlements, Measures of underlying inflation and their role in the conduct of 
monetary policy, June 1999. Proceedings of the workshop of central bank model builders held at the 
BIS on 18-19 February 1999.    
Calvo, Guillermo A and Carmen M Reinhart (2000): ￿Fear of floating￿. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper, 7993, November.  
Clarida, Richard and Jordi Gal￿ (1994): ￿Sources of real exchange rate fluctuations: how important are 
nominal shocks?￿ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 4658, February.     
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal￿ and Mark Gertler (1999): ￿The science of monetary policy: a new 
Keynesian perspective￿. Journal of Economic Literature￿, vol XXXVII, December, pp 1661-707.  
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal￿ and Mark Gertler (1998): ￿Monetary policy rules in practice: some 
international evidence￿. European Economic Review, 42:6, pp 1033-67.   
Dewachter, H and H Lustig (1997): ￿A cross-country comparison of CPI as a measure on inflation￿. 
Financial Economics, 27. Center for Economic Studies, Leuven.  
Folkertsma, C K and K S E M Hubrich (2000): ￿Performance of core inflation measures￿. Research 
Memorandum WO&E no  689. (Very preliminary and incomplete version.) Amsterdam: De 
Nederlandsche Bank.  
Gartner, Christine and Gert D Wehinger (1998): ￿Core inflation in selected European Union countries￿ 
in Bank for International Settlements, Topics in monetary policy modelling, August 1998, pp 1-44. BIS 
Conference Papers Vol. 6. Proceedings of the workshop of central bank model builders held at the BIS 
on 19-20 February 1998.  
Gerlach, Stefan and Frank Smets (1995): ￿The monetary transmission mechanism: evidence from the 
G-7 countries￿. BIS Working Paper, 26, April. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
Hausmann, Ricardo and Michael Gavin (1996): ￿Securing stability and growth in a shock-prone region: 
the policy challenge for Latin America￿ in Hausmann, Ricardo and Helmut Reisen (eds), Securing 
stability and growth in Latin America: policy issues and prospects for shock-prone economies. 
Paris: OECD. 
Hernandez, Leonardo and Peter J Montiel (2001): ￿Post-crisis exchange rate policy in five Asian 
countries: filling in the ￿hollow middle￿?￿ Draft paper prepared for the High Level Seminar ￿Exchange 
rate regimes: hard peg or free floating?￿, organised by the IMF Institute, held in Washington DC, 19-20 
March 2001.  
Mishkin, Frederic S, Miguel A Savastano (2000): ￿Monetary policy strategies for Latin America￿. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 7617, March.  
68  BIS Papers No 8
 
Obstfeld, Maurice (1985): ￿Floating exchange rates; experience and prospects￿. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2, pp 369-450. 
Ortiz, Guillermo (2000): ￿How should monetary policy makers react to the new challenges of global 
economic integration: the case of Mexico￿. Prepared for the symposium on ￿Global economic 
integration: opportunities and challenges￿, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 24-26 August 2000.      
Poole, W (1970): ￿Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model￿. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, pp 197-216.  
Quah, Danny and Shaun P Vahey (1995): ￿Measuring core inflation￿. The Economic Journal, 105, 
September, p 1130-44.    
Rudebusch, Glenn and Lars Svensson (1999): ￿Policy rules for inflation targeting￿ in Monetary policy 
rules. Proceedings of the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Monetary Policy 
Rules, Cheeca Lodge, Islamorada, Florida, 16-17 January 1998. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press.  
Svensson, Lars E O (1999): ￿Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule￿. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 43, pp 607-54. 
Svensson, Lars E O (1997): ￿Inflation forecasting targeting: implementing and monitoring inflation 
targets￿. European Economic Review, 41, October, pp 1111-46.    
Taylor, John B (1999): ￿The robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for 
interest rate setting by the European central bank￿. Journal of Monetary Economics, 43, pp 655-79.  
Taylor, John B (1993): ￿Macroeconomic policy in a world economy: from econometric design to 
practical operation￿. New York: W W Norton.   
Wynne, Mark A (1999): ￿Core inflation: a review of some conceptual issues￿ in Bank for International 
Settlements, Measures of underlying inflation and their role in the conduct of monetary policy, June 
1999. Proceedings of the workshop of central bank model builders held at the BIS on 18-19 February 
1999.   